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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
CRIMINAL LAW-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COURT
CONCERNING POSSIBLE PARDON OR PAROLE
OF THE ACCUSED
During the deliberation of a jury in a murder prosecution,
the jury foreman requested information concerning the granting
of paroles and pardons. The court responded by reading and
discussing the pardon and parole board's published rules and reg-
ulations concerning the granting of paroles and pardons. The
jury thereafter returned a verdict of guilty without a sentence
recommendation. Held: It was erroneous for the trial court to
read and discuss, at the request of the jury, the published rules
and regulations concerning the granting of paroles and pardons;
but such error was waived when the accused failed to raise an
objection.'
This decision is of interest for it presents questions which
have long plagued the American judiciary. Should a jury, faced
with the task of determining a defendant's guilt and of imposing
or recommending his punishment, be entitled to instructions as
to the possibility of executive interference with the sentence by
way of pardon, parole, or time off for good behavior? And if
so, should it be allowed to take this information into consider-
ation in its deliberation on the verdict or sentence recommenda-
tion?
The decisions concerning these questions are in disagreement,
and two distinct and conflicting rules seem to have been developed.
The first rule is that the court should refuse to answer a ques-
tion from the jury concerning the possibility of executive re-
duction of the sentence, and should clearly inform the jury that
the matter is not a proper element to be considered in its de-
liberations.2  This rule was followed in the present case. The
second rule is that it is proper for the trial court to instruct the
IBland v. State, 84 S.E.2d 369 (Ga. 1954). But see Balkcom v.
State, 86 Ga. App. 513, 71 S.E.2d 554 (1952) and Weeks v. State, 63
Ga. App. 773, 11 S.E.2d 670 (1940), both holding that it was not error
to give, apparently without any query from the jury, an instruction as
to the possibility of time off for good behavior, the court saying that
such an instruction should always be given in order to inform the jury
of the effect of its sentence.
2Lovely v. United States 169 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1943); Ryan v.
United States, 99 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1938); McCray v. State, 74 So.2d
491 (Ala. 1954); Bell v. State, 265 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. 1954); People
v. Letourneau, 34 Cal.2d 478, 211 P.2d 865 (1949); People v. Alcald4,
24 Cal.2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal.2d 306,
125 P.2d 29 (1942); Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941);
Strickland v. State 209 Ga. 65, 70 S.E.2d 710 (1952); Thompson v.
CASENOTES
jury upon request about the possibility of future executive in-
tervention with the sentence to be rendered, and that such in-
formation is a proper matter for the consideration of the jury."
Nebraska follows this rule by holding that it is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court to answer such questions of a jury.4
In the present case, the holding that the error of reading
and discussing the rules of the parole and pardon board was waived
when the defendant failed to make timely objection follows the
general weight of authority in those jurisdictions which hold it is
error for the trial judge to answer questions concerning the
future possibilities of parole or pardon during the sentence im-
posed.5 However, other courts have held that such failure to
State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S.E.2d 54 (1948); Brannon v. State, 118 Ga. 15,
2 S.E.2d 654 (1939); Houston v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 272, 192 S.W.2d
45 (1937); Gains v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46 S.W.2d 75 (1932);
State v. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 S.W.2d 751 (1953); Liska v. State,
115 Ohio St. 283. 152 N.E. 667 (1926); Bean v. State, 58 Okla. Crim.
432, 54 P.2d 675 (1936); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81
A.2d 569 (1951); Commonwealth v. Carey, 368 Pa. 157, 82 A.2d 240
(1951); Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 428, 39 A.2d 572 (1944);
Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234 S.W.2d 993 (195,0); Porter v.
State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151 S.W.2d 171 (1941); Gibson v. State. 153 Tex.
Crim. 582, 223 S.W.2d 625 (1949); Moore v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 312,
213 S.W.2d 844 (1948); Prater v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 35, 95 S.W.2d
971 (1936); Jonesv. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952);
McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 429, 45 S.E.2d 768 (1939); Coward
v. Commonwealth. 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797 (1935).
3Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002, 204 S.W.2d 373 (1947); Jones v.
State, 88 Ga. App. 330, 76 S.E.2d 810 (1953); State v. Lammers, 171
Kan. 668, 237 P.2d 410 (1951); State v. Satcher, 124 La. 1015, 50 So.
835 (1909); State v. Dworecki, 124 N.J.L. 219, 10 A.2d 287 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1940); State v. Barth, 114 N.J.L. 112, 176 Atl. 183 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935); State v. Rombolo, 89 N.J.L. 565, 99 Atl. 434 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1916); State v. Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N.E.2d 385 (1950);
Licavoli v. State, 20 Ohio Ops. 562, 34 N.E.2d 450 (1935); Commonwealth
v. Wooding, 355 Pa. 555, 50 A.2d 323 (1947); State v. Buttry, 199 Wash.
228, 90 P.2d 1026 (1929); State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542
(1937).
4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1116 (Reissue 1952); Griffith v. State, 157 Neb.
448, 59 N.W.2d 701 (1953); Sundahl v. State, 154 Neb. 550, 48 N.W.2d
689 (1951); Dinsmore v. State, 61 Neb. 418, 85 N.W. 445 (1901).
5People v. Barclay, 40 Cal.2d 146, 252 P.2d 321 (1953); People v.
Ramos, 3 Cal.2d 269, 44 P.2d 301 (1935); Postell v. Commonwealth,
174 Ky. 272, 192 S.W. 39 (1917), overruled on other grounds; Powell
v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S.W.2d 279 (1938); State v. Quilling,
363 Mo. 1016, 256 S.W.2d 751 (1953); State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309,
234 S.W.2d 587 (1950); Hudman v. State, 89 Okla. Crim. 160, 205 P.2d
1175 (1949); Prater v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 35, 95 S.W.2d 971 (1936);
McCann v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 429, 4 S.E.2d 768 (1939).
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object will not preclude review of the error on appeal. 6 One
jurisdiction has taken the view that the appellate court should
reverse on its own motion, even though the defendant's counsel
had concurred in the giving of the instruction, because such con-
sent by defendant's counsel to the court's action under the cir-
cumstances "would have been fraught with grave peril to his
client."7
It is also generally held that the jury must arrive at its ver-
dict from evidence regularly produced in the course of the trial
proceedings, and not from their own personal knowledge.8 It
cannot be questioned that executive interference with sentences
commonly occurs and that this is common knowledge to jurors,
although they usually are not cognizant of the specific rules and
regulations on the subject. Since jurors have no right to un-
dertake an independent investigation of the law in the jury
room,!' and since there is every likelihood that whatever know-
ledge the individual jurors may possess on the subject of punish-
ment will be used by the jury in its deliberation, the court should
make sure that the jury is properly informed regarding the law
pertaining to the possibilities of a parole or pardon of the accused
in the particular case.
To hold otherwise leaves the jury in a state of confusion.
Not specifically knowing the law of puishment, they may reach
a final decision based upon misconceptions as to what the law
upon the subject actually is.
It is submitted that it is proper to instruct the jury upon
their request as to the possibility of future executive intervention
in the sentence which will result from their decision or recom-
mendation, and that such information is proper for the jury to
take into consideration in its deliberation.
Robert E. Roeder, '56
6In Bell v. State, 265 S.W.2d 709 (Ark. 1954) the court held error
was committed by the trial judge in stating to the jury during deliberation,
in response to inquiry, that life termers usually were released on parole
after serving 7 to 10 years imprisonment. The court said this was so
highly prejudical that objection thereto upon learning of such statement
could not have erased the damage done and failure of defendant to object
or move for mistrial did not constitute a "waiver of such error." In
Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952), the court
held there was no waiver of error when counsel for defendant was taken
by surprise at the occurrence of the erroneous instruction.
7Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P.2d 233 (1941).
S Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, (1861); Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co. v.
Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 (1902).
PState v. McCail, 63 S.D. 649, 263 N.W. 157 (1935).
